Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Traditionally the theory of international trade has been dominated by extending general equilibrium analysis, i.e. by assuming competitive m a r k ets in all countries without international factor mobility, but more or less international mobility o f products. This led to well-known reasons for international trade like comparative cost advantages, elaborated by the pure theory of international trade. Notice, however, that international trade can already be triggered by di erent market organization in di erent c o u n tries. An extreme case would be a centrally planned economy f a c i n g a m a r k et economy. Here the centrally planned economy w ould choose its optimal point on the o er curve of the market economy and thereby induce international trade even when the two c o u n tries are otherwise completely identical (G th, 1976 ).
Recently we experience quite a change in the theory of international trade: Instead by general equilibrium analysis it is now dominated by the theory of industrial organization which, in turn, is dominated by the use of (non-)cooperative g a m e theory. In essence, the new models of international trade are oligopoly markets with sellers and customers from di erent c o u n tries. The advantages of this change are institutionally richer models of international trade, its pitfalls are those of neglecting general equilibrium e ects. Clearly, the latter are relatively harmless when considering special products whose shares in the national gross product are relatively low. If not partial analysis may neglect some of the most crucial consequences.
Especially in view of this recent d e v elopment one can ask which role game theory plays or can play when studying international cooperation, e.g. in the form of international trade. To a void reviewing all the recent literature which often can be interpreted as a game theoretic analysis of international markets with agents from di erent c o u n tries we discuss merely the bargaining aspects which arise in such i n ternational cooperation.
There are rare market institutions like stock or commodity e x c hanges where one can engage in trade without having to bargain about the terms of trade. Given such institutions there also do not exist speci c problems of international trade. Here we do not consider such highly organized markets, but concentrate on markets where the terms of trade are the result of international negotiations.
In view of game theory bargaining is an application of game theoretic methods. Whereas in cooperative game theory the model abstracts from individual behavior, non-cooperative models of bargaining rely on highly speci c rules concerning the bargaining process and the information conditions of the interacting parties. Since we do not simply review bargaining theory (see, for instance, Bester, 1989 , G th, 1995 , Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990 ), but try to focus on the speci c institutional aspects of international negotiations, we rely on the latter approach. Whereas cooperative game theory simply assumes, for instance, perfect contract enforcement, we think that international cooperation often cannot rely on contract enforcement.
Problems when cooperating across borders
If the cooperating parties who bargain about the details of their cooperative v enture live in di erent countries, certain institutional aspects will become more crucial, if not be new. There is, of course, the problem of being able to communicate at all which, in modern times, has become more negligible although in international a airs one often struggles about what certain contract clauses imply, e.g. legally. The sender-receiver-game can be used to illustrate that cooperation requires some basic kind of language.
Sender-Receiver-Games: Let = fw 1 : : : w T g denote the nite set of states w 2 of the world with T 2. Whereas the sender S observes the true state w 2 of the world, the receiver R must choose the action a 2 A yielding the same (expected) utility u (a w) for both players R and S. Before choosing a 2 A player R receives a message m 2 M sent t o h i m b y S. F or the sake of simplicity let us assume that there are as many di erent messages as states of the world, i.e. E ective Cooperation in Sender-Receiver-Games requires only a kind of language m (w) in the sense that for all w 2 sender S can signal by m the actually prevailing state w. Given such a language receiver R will choose the optimal action a (m Clearly, one will not speak of bargaining if people are able to communicate in such an elementary way, i.e. cooperation per se does not lead to bargaining. Whether and how s u c h an elementary language develops can be analysed in an evolutionary way (Blume, Kim, and Sobel, 1993, W rneryd, 1993 ).
Although at least for Western Europe this will become less important in the next millennium, i n ternational cooperation often means that at least one party h a s t o accept foreign currency. Of course, in modern times one can avoid the currency risks involved. But one has to pay a risk premium which is non-existent if all parties are living in the same currency region.
Similarly, i n ternational cooperation in the form of trade usually is burdened by transportation costs in the widest sense, e.g. those implied by customs controls etc. But again modern means of transportation have reduced the cost share of transportation considerably for Germany i t w ould be still much c heaper to import hard coal from the USA than to provide it nationally. But it is still true that certain products implying high transportation cost like sand or cement are mostly regionally, i.e. often nationally supplied whereas international trade concerns mainly products where the cost share of transportation is relatively low.
Game theoretic or experimental studies of bargaining can easily incorporate such institutional aspects and investigate their implications for the likelihood as well as for the pro tability o f i n ternational cooperation. One also needs empirical eld studies by which one tries to assess institutional obstacles, e.g. requirements in national law which mainly (are to) discourage foreign competitors, or to measure the additional cost of international cooperation econometrically.
An aspect where one con hardly expect much help from such studies is incomplete information as, for instance, implied by c o m m unicating at least partly in a foreign language or resulting from cultural di erences (for an experimental analysis of cultural di erences see, for instance, Roth et al., 1991) .
Incomplete information essentially means that the negotiation rules are not commonly known. A p a r t y m a y not know the true incentives of its partners, their information conditions or even the time structure of the decision process. In his pioneering contribution John C. Harsanyi (1967/68) has shown that all these information de ciencies can be translated into uncertainties concerning the other parties' types, i.e. their (cardinal) utility functions and, more importantly, that such type uncertainty can be transformed into stochastic uncertainty b y including ctitious chance moves whose results are only partially revealed as to capture the type uncertainty of certain players.
G th and Selten (1989) have tried to elaborate how such t ype uncertainty c a n in uence the bargaining process. A p a r t y which w ants to appear as a superior type will try to gain such a reputation (see also Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson, 1982) by mimicing the superior type's behavior. Often the superior type will, however, be able to distinguish itself from inferior types by providing a risk proof of its superiority, e . g . b y risking con ict with positive probability due to not conceding, a risk from which inferior types would shy a way.
Clearly, national identy reduces the degree of uncertainty regarding the other parties' types. Cultural transfers and the, in modern times, much better knowledge of foreign cultures due to international exchanges via travelling abroad and via the modern mass media have, however, greatly reduced the degree of uncertainty about foreign cultures. Mostly it seems more important t o n d t h e right partners within a country than the right c o u n try for international cooperation, i.e. incomplete information is dominated by i n vidual di erences rather than by cultural ones (that this may be task dependent is suggested by R o t h e t a l . , 1991).
Cooperation without contract enforcement
Let us now concentrate on a more dramatic aspect of international cooperation, at least in its early days, namely the non-existence or practical impossibility of contract enforcement. T o demonstrate this let us refer to the most recent past when the Iron Curtain was still existent: If an Eastern European partner did not ful ll its obligations, its Western European partner would hardly engage in a legal dispute. It, much more likely, w ould have tried to exert pressure by political means, e.g. by trying to employ the foreign o ce. If also this is impossible or would not pay the e ort, international cooperation appears similar to cooperation in anarchy to which w e n o w turn our attention.
a) Interacting repeatedly
Game theory o ers some possibilities to enable cooperation even when contracts are not enforceable. If the partners interact repeatedly, o n e w ay of inducing the agreed upon behavior is to terminate cooperation (the grim strategy) or at least to interrupt it su ciently long. Due to the Folk Theorem players can cooperate e ciently by relying on such threats which are self-enforcing (e.g. Aumann, 1981) . One can question the relevance of the Folk Theorem, which requires an in nite horizon and does not only justify e cient outcomes, but (nearly) every outcome which is individually rational, as well as its normative justi cation (G th, Leininger, and Stephan, 1991).
Empirically one does not need in nitely many rounds to engage in mutually profitable cooperation (see, for instance, the respective experimental results of Selten and St cker, 1986, for the case of 20 rounds). Inspired by such experimental results an alternative game theoretic justi cation of self-enforcing cooperation relies on a nite horizon, but introduces type uncertainty. I f m y partner expects me with positive probability to su er from breeching contract since it is not justi ed at all why m y partner may think so, one often speaks of crazy perturbations , I myself might try to appear like this strange alter ego although I am completely opportunistic. In essence this will mean that I will be cooperative with high probability at the beginning and try to fool my partner when approaching the end of interaction.
Whoever has tried to actually compute such a reputation equilibrium (Kreps et al., 1982) will wonder how one can expect boundedly rational human decision makers to derive their behavioral plans in such a w ay (see, for instance, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992). More importantly, certain aspects of the experimentally o bserved behavior are inconsistent with the qualitative properties of reputation equilibria which predict, for instance, continued con ict after a transient breakdown of cooperation whereas actual players engage in attempts to restore cooperation.
b) The case of no repetition or the game of trust
In general, international cooperation may not be repetitive at all since depending on changing world market prices it is often better to cooperate with somebody in country A today, but in country B tomorrow w h a t m a y be, furthermore, rather unpredictable. Is there no chance of one shot-cooperative e n d e a vors when contracts are unenforceable? In the following this will be discussed with the help of the basic game of trust as thoroughly discussed by G th and Kliemt (1993, 1994, 1995 In the basic game of trust two partners, player a from country A and player b from country B, can either not cooperate (if a chooses N) or cooperate with a delivering rst (his move T). When a has revealed trust (by c hoosing T), player b can either reward him (the move R) or exploit a (by c hoosing E). Since r i > s i for i = a b cooperation in the sense of the play (T R) is e cient a n d p a yo dominates non-cooperation (N) which, however, is implied by the unique solution behavior (N T) in the sense of subgame perfect equilibria (Selten, 1965 and 1975) or of strategies surviving once repeated elimination of dominated strategies. In this sense the basic game of trust paradigmatically illustrates the impossibility o f cooperation when contracts are unenforceable. c) On the evolution of morals in international trade G th and Kliemt (1992, 1994, 1995) interprete the basic game of trust as representing just the monetary incentives. But although money seems to rule the world, it is not the only thing we care for. Imagine player b who considers to exploit his trustful partner a after he has chosen T. 
d) On possible generalizations
It has already been mentioned above t h a t t ype information will usually be less reliable in international a airs. The assumption of commonly known m-types appears therefore rather questionable in this context. Unfortunately, if one assumes m-types to be private information and beliefs concerning others' types to be governed by the true population composition, the above result is completely reversed (see G th and Kliemt, 1993, 1994, 1995 for details): The only evolutionarily stable population composition is the m-monomorphic one excluding any cooperation based on trust.
Prospects of international cooperation in case of costly type detection
Incomplete information must not be accepted. G th and Kliemt (1994 and 1995) prove that in case of costly detection there may exist an evolutionarily stable bimorphism, i.e. a population containing both, m-a n d m-types in positive p r oportions. The basic intuition for this result is that there must be su cient t ype uncertainty to render the investment in detection pro table and that in case of more or less reliable detection m-types are more successful than m-type like i n the border case of commonly known m-types.
The results when type information can be obtained by i n vesting in type detection are graphically illustrated in Figure 2 in the p, C-diagram where p is the share of m-types in the population and C the cost of type detection. For cost levels C C type detection is too costly. Thus m-types remain private information what implies that m-types fare better than m-types and that p converges to p = 0 , the only evolutionarily stable population composition for C C.
In case of C < C the nal result depends on the starting point, i.e. what nally happens is path dependent. Within the triangle of Figure 2 one invests in type detection since its costs are non-prohibitive and since the population is su ciently mixed to render type information su ciently valuable. When type information is available, m-types are more successful than m-types what explains why t h e arrows within the triangle are pointing to the right, i.e. p increases over time.
To the left and to the right side of the triangle in Figure 2 one does not invest in type detection since there is not enough type uncertainty to render such a n investment pro table. Thus one obtains similar consequences as for C C, i . e . p decreases over time.
So for cost levels C < C one has two e v olutionarily stable p-con gurations, namely the m-monomorphic population with p = 0 or the bimorphic population p = p (C) whose population share p (C) of trustworthy partners increases when C decreases.
Whenever the starting point p is to the left of p (C) or when C C, the process ends with p = 0 , whereas it ends with p = p (C) for C < C and p > p (C). T h e set of attraction for the stable con gurations p = p (C) is thus as illustrated in Figure 3 whereas p = 0 results if one starts outside of the p = p (C)-attraction set.
If the type information from investing in type recognition is informative, but not certain, i.e. in case of stochastic type signals, the triangle in Figure 2 shrinks. In Figure 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Policy measures improving the prospects of international cooperation
Based on our analysis in section 4 we w ant to analyse policy measures by w h i c h one can improve the prospects of international cooperation which i s e n d a n g e r e d by t ype uncertainty. L i k e in our discussion above uncertainty about the second mover's type in the game of trust may, h o wever, be reduced by i n vesting in costly type detection. In principle, policy could in uence parameter values by Measures of type (i) essentially require an increase of the initial proportion p of trustworthy m-types. In addition to well-known measures like education and punishing or stigmatizing exploiters it could mean to start international cooperation only when trustworthiness is su ciently large.
The obvious means for (ii) are to provide type information freely, e . g . by t h e diplomatic services, or at least to subsidize all attempts to learn more about potential foreign partners. Also requirements for self-revelation, e.g. by asking to publish a rm's main characteristics like the amount o f e q u i t y, present pro ts etc. can reduce the cost of type detection.
The reliability o f t ype detection can be improved by means which a l l o w t o b a s e a detective's type assessment on more reliable indicators, e.g. by granting access to a rm's accounts etc. It seems that generally all requirements for transparency in economic and political life could be viewed as policy measures in the sense of (iii).
A further policy measure would be to guarantee contract enforcement b y international courts whose verdicts are binding, i.e. require supporting national law.
This will certainly help to exclude major risks. But since contracts are mostly incomplete, even enforceable contracts will allow for opportunistic exploitation. Thus international courts may levy the obstacles of international cooperation, but cannot avoid them totally. Like in national cooperation one needs trustworthy partners since legal verdicts are often impossible, too costly, or too late in e ect.
Actually Brennan, G th, and Kliemt (1997a and 1997b) have i n troduced the possibility of litigation when a has been exploited. Interesting aspects of their analysis is that judges are not better , i.e. they judge according their m-type so that the moral evolution also changes the reliability of the legal system, and their analysis whether legal enforcement will crowd out or crowd in intrinsic motivation in the sense of m-types satisfying m < r b ; 1 ( < 0).
Conclusions
Our modest aim was to discuss the most important institutional aspects which one encounters in international negotiations. Some of them were brie y discussed whereas the non-existence of contract enforcement has been explored more thoroughly by relying on the previous results of G th and Kliemt (1993, 1994, and 1995) . Another speciality of our analysis above i s t h a t w e do not only explore the game theoretic solution behavior, but also discuss its predictive success, mainly by referring to appropriate experimental results.
Since bargaining and thus international bargaining is mostly an application of (cooperative or, like here, non-cooperative) game model there exists an abundance of bargaining models. Without empirical research trying to nd out the actually used rules of international negotiations, in politics (see, for instance, Mautner-Markhof, 1989) or in business hardly anything speci c can be said. The empirical, mainly experimental study of bargaining behavior for well-de ned rules of negotiations has to be supplemented by empirical institutional research nding out the actually applied rules. Only with such empirical institutional evidence one can derive more speci c conclusions about the prospects of international cooperation, either as implications of game theoretic rationality o r b y empirical, e.g. experimental studies.
